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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, the Illinois Supreme and Appellate
Courts addressed the constitutionality and application of statutes
of limitations, interrelationships of voluntary dismissals and other
rules and statutes, jurisdiction, venue and forum non conveniens.
The courts also considered pleadings and discovery matters, judg-
ments and post-judgment relief, new trial standards, appeals, col-
lateral estoppel, settlements and contribution, judicial discretion
affecting juries, and attorney's fees. Also during the Survey period,
the Illinois Supreme Court adopted new rules and amended ex-
isting rules affecting discovery, small claims procedures, and court-
annexed mandatory arbitration.
The Illinois General Assembly enacted significant procedures in
pleading actions for punitive damages, amended the truth in plead-
ing law, abolished "pure" comparative negligence by adopting
"modified" comparative negligence rules, and modified the "collat-
eral source rule." The legislature also shortened the statute of lim-
itations and repose for medical malpractice actions involving
minors, and passed a new and revised mortgage foreclosure law.
This article will briefly highlight and explain the potential impact
of the most significant cases, rules, and statutory actions.
II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND REPOSE
A. Constitutionality and Applicability
The various periods of limitation enacted by the legislature are
due, in large part, to differences in the activities from which the
cause of action arose, and the diverse degrees of harm inherent in
those activities. Legislative classifications based upon such legiti-
mate differences carry a strong presumption of validity. These
classifications will be overturned only when the classification is
clearly unreasonable and palpably arbitrary and, therefore, consti-
tutes special legislation prohibited by the Illinois Constitution.
Section 13-214(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure' pro-
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-214(a) (1983) (amended Supp. 1987). The
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vides a two-year statute of limitations for tort and contract actions
involving construction operations. The Illinois Supreme Court re-
cently considered whether section 13-214(a) contravened the con-
stitutional prohibition against unreasonable and arbitrary
classifications.2 In People ex. rel. Skinner v. Hellmuth, Obata &
Kassbaum, Inc. ,3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that section 13-
214(a) does not violate the special legislation provision of article
IV, section 13 of the Illinois Constitution.4
In Skinner, the plaintiff sued the defendant architectural and en-
gineering firm for damages allegedly caused by defects in the de-
sign and construction of a building.' The defendant moved to
dismiss the complaint as barred by the two-year statute of limita-
tions in section 13-214(a).6 In opposition, the plaintiff argued that
the statute of limitations in section 13-214(a) violates the special
legislation provision of article IV, section 13 of the Illinois Consti-
tution. 7 The Skinner court, however, reiterated the strong pre-
sumption in favor of the legitimacy and reasonableness of
legislative classifications on the basis of activities.8 The court rea-
amendment changed the limitation period from two years to four years. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 13-214(a) (Supp. 1987).
2. Id.
3. 114 I1. 2d 252, 500 N.E.2d 34 (1986).
4. Id. at 263, 500 N.E.2d at 38. Article IV, section 13 of the 1970 Illinois Constitu-
tion states:
The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is
or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable
shall be a matter for judicial determination.
ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13. This section requires that the laws apply uniformly throughout
the state to all persons in like circumstances and conditions. Davis v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 61 111. 2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 881 (1975). It does not prohibit the legislative
classification of persons, but requires that such classifications be reasonably related to the
legislative purpose in enacting the legislation. Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402
N.E.2d 560 (1979), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980).
5. Skinner, 114 Ill. 2d at 256, 500 N.E.2d at 35.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 258-59, 500 N.E.2d at 36.
8. Id. at 262, 500 N.E.2d at 38. A presumption exists in favor of the validity of a
legislative classification, and the court will not interfere unless the classification is clearly
arbitrary or unreasonable. City of Danville v. Industrial Commission, 38 Ill. 2d 479, 231
N.E.2d 404 (1967). In Skinner, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that it gives particular
deference to legislative classifications that are based on activities rather than the status of
persons. Skinner, 114 Ill. 2d at 262, 500 N.E.2d at 38. The Skinner court cited a number
of cases in which this distinction was recognized: Fireside Chrysler-Plymouth, Mazda,
Inc. v. Edgar, 102 Ill. 2d 1, 464 N.E.2d 275, appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 926 (1984) (up-
holding a statute that prohibited automobile dealers from operating on Sundays because
the activities of the dealers was distinguishable from other businesses); Fujimura v. Chi-
cago Transit Authority, 67 Ill. 2d 506, 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977) (upholding a statute that
applied solely to plaintiffs suing the Chicago Transit Authority (the "C.T.A.") because of
the C.T.A.'s unique activities that distinguish it from other defendants); Davis v. Corn-
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soned that, because section 13-214(a) contains a classification on
the basis of activities, it deserves the benefit of such a presump-
tion.9 The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to rebut this pre-
sumption, and, therefore, his claims based on negligent design,
supervision, and construction were barred by the two-year limita-
tions period in section 13-214(a).10
The court, however, refused to apply the protection of section
13-214(a) to sureties." In Skinner, United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Company ("USF&G") was the surety of a general con-
tractor who defaulted on a construction contract.' 2 Because of the
performance bond between the general contractor and USF&G, a
default by the general contractor obligated USF&G to the plaintiff
in the amount of the contract between the general contractor and
the plaintiff.' 3 USF&G argued that any claims against it as the
general contractor's surety were barred because the claims against
the general contractor for any alleged default were barred by the
statute of limitations. '4 The court rejected this argument for three
reasons.'5 First, the court ruled that the statutory language itself
precluded application to a surety because the "[i]ssuance of a per-
formance bond cannot be deemed to be engaging in the design,
planning, supervision, observation or management of construction,
or construction."' 6 The court then determined that the bond itself
contained no limitation on the time in which suit could be
brought.' 7 Finally, the court held that claims based upon bonds
were subject only to the "normally" applicable ten-year statute of
limitations in section 13-206 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure.'" The court concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff's claims
based solely on the performance bond were outside the scope of
monwealth Edison Co., 61111. 2d 494, 336 N.E.2d 881 (1975) (upholding a statute that
applied only to construction activities). Skinner, 114 Il1. 2d at 261-62, 500 N.E.2d at 37-
38.
9. Skinner, 114 Ill. 2d at 263, 500 N.E.2d at 38.
10. Id. The plaintiff did not challenge the trial court's finding that the plaintiff knew
of his injury in 1977. Id. at 258, 400 N.E.2d at 36. The plaintiff filed the suit six years
later in 1983. Id.
11. Id. at 264, 500 N.E.2d at 39.
12. Id. at 263-64, 500 N.E.2d at 39.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 263, 5C N.E.2d at 39.
15. Id. at 264, 500 N.E.2d at 39. The court relied on People v. Whittemore, 253 I11.
378, 97 N.E. 683 (1912). In Whittemore, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that "a surety
is never discharged because a cause of action ... against the principal ... is barred by the
statute of limitations." Id. at 385, 97 N.E.2d at 686.
16. Skinner, 114 Ill. 2d at 263, 500 N.E. 2d at 39.
17. Id. at 264, 500 N.E.2d at 39.
18. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-206 (1983)).
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section 13-214(a). 19
B. Rule 103(b) and Voluntary Dismissal
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) 20 requires that a plaintiff be
reasonably diligent in effecting the service of process.2' If the
plaintiff fails to diligently effect service after the expiration of the
statute of limitations, the court may, on its own motion or on the
motion of any defendant, dismiss the case with prejudice.22 Con-
versely, section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure23 al-
lows a plaintiff to dismiss voluntarily his case at any time before
trial or hearing, regardless of whether service of process is effected
after the expiration of the statute of limitations.24 Furthermore,
section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure2 ' grants a
plaintiff, who has voluntarily dismissed his case, one year in which
to refile his case, regardless of the expiration of the statute of limi-
tations and his lack of diligence in the service of process.26
In O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital,27 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that when a plaintiff invokes sections 2-1009 and 13-217 in
order to escape the possibility of involuntary dismissal under a
pending rule 103(b) motion, the court must first rule on the rule
103(b) motion before ruling on plaintiff's motion to voluntarily
dismiss under section 2-1009.28 The O'Connell court further held
that, when ruling on a rule 103(b) motion in a case refiled under
section 13-217, the court may consider the plaintiff's diligence in
the service of process in both his original and refiled case. 29
Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court extended the reach of
O'Connell in Catlett v. Novak.a° In Catlett, the defendant, Illinois
Central Gulf Railroad ("ICG"), never had been served in the origi-
nal action, which was filed one day before the expiration of the
statute of limitations.3 ' The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the
19. Id. at 263, 500 N.E.2d 39.
20. ILL. S. CT. R. 103(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 103(b) (1985).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1985).
24. Id.
25. Id. at para. 13-217.
26. Id.
27. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986). For a discussion of O'Connell, see
Kandaras & Wozniak, Civil Procedure, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
317, 319-21 (1986).
28. O'Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 283, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
29. Id.
30. 116 11. 2d 63, 506 N.E.2d 586 (1987).
31. Id. at 65, 506 N.E.2d at 587.
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case under section 2-1009, and reified the case under section 13-
217.32 The plaintiff successfully served process on ICG on the re-
filed complaint.33 ICG filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of the
expiration of the statute of limitations as well as the plaintiff's lack
of diligence in the service of process in the original case. 34 Apply-
ing O'Connell, the court held that the defendant was entitled to a
rule 103(b) hearing regarding the plaintiff's diligence in the service
of process in both the original case and the refiled case.35 It is note-
worthy that the Catlett court, without discussion, applied the
O'Connell rule retroactively, taking into consideration the plain-
tiff's diligence in serving ICG in the original case.36
C. Refiling After Voluntary Dismissal
Section 2-1009 provides that a voluntary dismissal is to be ef-
fected "by order filed in the cause."' 37 The statute may be inter-
preted to require the filing of a written order, rather than a docket
entry by the clerk. When the clerk makes a docket entry noting an
order granting a plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal, which
does not reflect that a written order is to follow, but a written order
is signed subsequently by the same judge several weeks later, an
ambiguity may arise about which order shall govern. This is par-
ticularly important to a party who must file a timely amended
complaint under section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In
Swisher v. Duffy',38 a sharply divided Illinois Supreme Court held
that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 272 39determines the entry date
of an order granting a voluntary dismissal for purposes of deter-
mining whether a case was timely refiled under section 13-217. 40
32. Id. at 66, 506 N.E.2d at 588.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 71, 506 N.E.2d at 590.
36. Id.
37. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2.1009 (1985).
38. 117 Ill. 2d 376, 512 N.E.2d 1207 (1987).
39. ILL. S. Cr. R. 272, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 272 (1985). Rule 272 deter-
mines when final orders are entered for purposes of determining the time allowed for
appeal. Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293, 472 N.E.2d 400, 402 (1984). Rule 272
states:
If at the time of announcing final judgment the judge requires the submission of
a form of written judgment to be signed by him, the clerk shall make a notation
to that effect and the judgment becomes final only when the signed judgment is
filed. If no such written judgment is to be filed, the judge or clerk shall forth-
with make a notation of the judgment and enter the judgment of record
promptly, and the judgment is entered at the time it is entered of record.
ILL. S. Cr. R. 272, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 272 (1985).
40. Swisher, 117 Il. 2d at 379, 512 N.E.2d at 1209. Section 13-217 grants a plaintiff
1988]
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In Swisher, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for a vol-
untary dismissal.4 Three weeks later, the trial court signed a writ-
ten order of the voluntary dismissal of the case. 2 One year after
the written order was signed, the plaintiff refiled the case pursuant
to section 13-217.4 3 The trial court, however, granted the defend-
ant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to refile his case
within one year of the voluntary dismissal order," as required by
section 13-217. 45 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the one-year
refiling period did not begin to run until the trial court signed the
written voluntary dismissal order."6 He claimed that Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 272, which governs final judgments, did not
apply because the voluntary dismissal was not a final and appeala-
ble order.47 The plaintiff further contended that Supreme Court
Rule 27148 established the entry date of the voluntary dismissal
order.49  The Illinois Supreme Court held that a voluntary dismis-
sal order is final and appealable, 50 and, therefore, that rule 272 de-
termined the entry date of the order.-" The court further explained
that rule 272 requires a written order of judgment only when the
judge requests one.52 In Swisher, the trial court did not request a
written order at the time it granted the voluntary dismissal.5 3 Ac-
cordingly, the order was final when orally pronounced by the
who voluntarily dismissed his case one year in which to refile his case. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1985).
41. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 377, 512 N.E.2d at 1208.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id, at 379, 512 N.E.2d at 1209.
45. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1985).
46. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 379, 512 N.E.2d at 1209.
47. Id.
48. ILL. S. CT. R. 271, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1lOA, para. 271 (1985). Rule 271 states:
When the court rules upon a motion other than in the course of trial, the attor-
ney for the prevailing party shall prepare and present to the court the order or
judgment to be entered, unless the court directs otherwise.
Id. Rule 271 requires the entry of a written order before the judgment is enforceable.
Stewart v. Stewart, 35 Ill. App. 3d 236, 240, 341 N.E.2d 136, 139 (1st Dist. 1976).
49. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 379, 512 N.E.2d at 1209.
50. Kahle v. John Deere Co., 104 Il1. 2d 302, 472 N.E.2d 787 (1984).
51. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 380-81, 512 N.E.2d at 1209-10.
52. ILL. S. CT. R. 272, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 272 (1985). Section 2-1009 of
the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure states that a plaintiff may obtain a voluntary dismis-
sal "by order filed in the cause." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1985). In
Swisher, the Illinois Supreme Court held that this language does not mean that a written
order is required, and therefore, that section 2-1009 does not affect the application of
Rule 272. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 381, 512 N.E. 2d at 1210.
53. Swisher, 117 Ill. 2d at 380, 512 N.E.2d at 1210.
Civil Procedure
court.5 4 Because the plaintiff did not refile within one year of the
court's voluntary dismissal order, the trial court properly dis-
missed the case."5
D. Voluntary Dismissal and Refiling for Jury Demand
The appellate courts have limited the effect of O'Connell5 6 to
rule 103(b) cases when the effect of section 2-1009 is considered in
relation to statutes other than rule 103(b). For example, in Kern v.
Peabody, 1 the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fifth District held
that a plaintiff who failed to file a jury demand when it filed its
original case had an absolute right to dismiss voluntarily the case
under section 2-1009 and refile the case under section 13-217 in
order to file a jury demand.58
In Kern, the plaintiffs sued the defendant coal mining company
and sought damages for allegedly illegal and unauthorized mining
by the defendant on the plaintiffs' land.59 The plaintiffs did not
demand a jury at the time they filed their complaint. 6w The defend-
ant answered the complaint and admitted most of the allegations.6'
Thereafter, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their case, refiled it
on the same day, and demanded a jury.62 The defendant moved to
set aside the order granting the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal.63
Citing O'Connell," the defendant argued that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to a voluntary dismissal because it permitted them to
circumvent the requirements for filing a jury demand. 5 The Kern
court distinguished O'Connell on the grounds that the rule 103(b)
issue that was present in O'Connell was absent in Kern.66 In addi-
tion, the defendant argued that allowing the plaintiffs a jury trial,
to which they were not entitled in the original case, denied the
defendant his right to due process and equal protection under the
54. Id. at 381, 512 N.E.2d at 1210.
55. Id.
56. For a discussion of O'Connell, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
57. 151 Ill. App. 3d 807, 502 N.E.2d 1322 (5th Dist. 1987).
58. Id. at 811, 502 N.E.2d at 1325.
59. Id. at 808, 502 N.E.2d at 1323.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. For a discussion of O'Connell, see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
65. Kern, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 811, 502 N.E.2d at 1325.
66. Id. The defendant in Kern did not challenge the plaintiff's diligence in the service
of process. Id. The only issue in Kern was whether the plaintiff could voluntarily dismiss
and refile in order to demand a jury. Id. at 808, 502 N.E.2d at 1323.
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law guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions.6 7
The Kern court held that section 2-1009 does not violate the due
process or the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution68 or article I, section 2 of
the Illinois Constitution.69 The court stated that the plaintiff's
right to a voluntary dismissal does not extinguish the right of
either party to demand a jury.7°
Another case in which the right to voluntary dismissal was at
issue is Rohr v. Knaus.71 In Rohr, a medical malpractice action,
witnesses, including the plaintiff's expert medical witnesses, were
deposed, and extensive hospital records were produced in discov-
ery.72 Subsequently, the defendants moved for summary judgment
under section 2-1005. 73 Prior to the summary judgment motion
hearing date, the plaintiff successfully moved for voluntary dismis-
sal under section 2-1009.74 The appellate court affirmed the volun-
tary dismissal order.75 The appellate court ruled that O'Connell7 6
did not apply, and, because the right to voluntary dismissal had
existed at common law in a more extensive form and by statute for
many years, further restriction on the voluntary dismissal privilege
should be addressed to the General Assembly or the Supreme
Court.7
E. Medical Malpractice
In Penkava v. Kasbohm, s the Illinois Supreme Court considered
whether the statute of limitations and repose provided by section
67. Id. at 807-08, 502 N.E.2d at 1323. For the text of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, see infra notes 68 and
69.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states: "No State
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
69. Kern, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 812, 502 N.E.2d at 1326 (citing Ill. Const. art. I, § 2).
Article I, section 2 of the Illinois Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of
the laws." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
70. Kern, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 812, 502 N.E.2d at 1326.
71. 153 Il. App. 3d 1013, 506 N.E.2d 634 (5th Dist. 1987).
72. Id. at 1014, 506 N.E.2d at 635.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1017, 506 N.E.2d at 637.
76. For a discussion of O'Connell, me supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
77. Rohr, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 1017, 506 N.E.2d at 637.
78. 117 Ill. 2d 149, 510 N.E.2d 883 (1987). For a further discussion of Penkava, see
infra notes 208-19 and accompanying text.
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22. 179 protected registered nurses.80  In Penkava, the plaintiff
brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital and a reg-
istered nurse employed by the hospital.8 ' The trial court granted
the defendant's motions to dismiss because the claims were barred
by the statute of limitations.8 2 The appellate court reversed the
dismissal as to the nurse, holding that the statute of limitations
applied only to actions against physicians and hospitals.8 3 The ap-
pellate court reasoned that the statute, as originally enacted, did
not specifically include registered nurses, but was amended subse-
quently to include registered nurses." Accordingly, the appellate
court ruled that the legislative amendment to include registered
nurses supported the conclusion that prior to the amendment, reg-
istered nurses were excluded from the statute of limitations. 5
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court
and concluded that the term "hospitals" in section 22.1 as origi-
nally enacted, implicitly included registered nurses as employees
caring for patients in hospitals.8 6 The court explained that the stat-
ute was amended in order to protect all registered nurses and not
just those nurses employed by hospitals.8 7 The defendant nurse in
Penkava, therefore, was protected by the statute as originally en-
acted because she was employed by the co-defendant hospital.8 8
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, para. 22.1 (1981) (amended and currently found at ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (1985)). The 1981 version of section 22.1 stated:
No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist or
hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or
breach of contract, or otherwise arising out of patient care shall be brought
more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of
the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action,
whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought
more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or
occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death
except as provided in Section 22 of this Act.
If the person entitled to bring the action is, at the time the cause of action
occurred, under the age of 18 years, or insane, or mentally ill, or imprisoned on
criminal charges, the period of limitations does not begin to run until the disa-
bility is removed.
Id.
80. Penkava, 117 Ill. 2d at 157, 510 N.E.2d at 886-87.
81. Id. at 151, 510 N.E.2d at 883.
82. Id. at 151, 510 N.E.2d at 883-84.
83. Id. at 152, 510 N.E.2d at 884.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 156, 510 N.E.2d at 886.
87. Id. at 157, 510 N.E.2d at 886-87.
88. Id. at 157-58, 510 N.E.2d at 887.
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III. JURISDICTION
Section 2-203(a) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure 9 pro-
vides the requirements for the service of summons upon an individ-
ual defendant. 90 It has long been the rule in Illinois that a
judgment rendered by a court that lacks personal or subject matter
jurisdiction may be challenged and vacated at any time or in any
court, either collaterally or directly. 91 Substituted service of sum-
mons under section 2-203(a) must strictly comply with every statu-
tory requirement; the presumption of validity that applies to a
return reciting personal service does not apply to substituted ser-
vice.92 This policy is so strong that it recently was applied in a case
involving intervening third party rights. In State Bank of Lake
Zurich v. Thill,93 the Illinois Supreme Court held defective an affi-
davit that failed to show compliance with all the requirements of
section 2-203(a) in serving the defendant.94
In Thill, the defendant, who had not previously appeared in the
matter, entered a special and limited appearance in order to attack
the circuit court's personal jurisdiction.9" The defendant claimed
that he had never been served properly with summons and, there-
fore, that the judgment against him was void.96 The plaintiff, ac-
knowledging that the affidavit was incomplete, claimed that proper
service had been made on the defendant.97 In addition, the plaintiff
89. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-203(a) (1985). Section 2-203(a) states:
Service on individuals. (a) Except as otherwise expressly provided, service of
summons upon an individual defendant shall be made (1) by leaving a copy
thereof with the defendant personally or (2) by leaving a copy at the defendant's
usual place of abode, with some person of the family, of the age of 13 years or
upwards, and informing that person of the contents thereof, provided the officer
or other person making service shall also send a copy of the summons in a
sealed envelope with postage fully prepaid, addressed to the defendant at his or
her usual place of abode. The certificate of the officer or affidavit of the person
that he or she has sent the copy in pursuance of this Section is evidence that he
or she has done so.
Id.
90. Id.
91. R.W. Sawant & Co. v. Allied Programs Corp., 111 IIll. 2d 304, 489 N.E.2d 1360
(1986).
92. Werner v. W. H. Shons Co., 341 Ill. 478, 173 N.E.2d 486 (1930).
93. 113 Ill. 2d 294, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986).
94. Id. at 311, 497 N.E.2d at 1163. The affidavit failed to state that: (1) the summons
was served on the defendant, (2) a copy of the summons was left with the defendant's
wife for substituted service, and (3) a copy of the summons was mailed to the defendant.
Id.
95. Id. at 303, 497 N.E.2d at 1157. The trial court had entered a default judgment of
foreclosure and sale against him. Id.
96. Id. at 307, 497 N.E.2d at 1159.
97. Id. at 304, 497 N.E.2d at 1159.
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stated that the findings of proper jurisdiction over the parties re-
cited by the circuit court in the judgment were determinative of the
jurisdiction issue.98 An unusual aspect of this case was that inter-
vening third parties had purchased the subject property and
claimed their rights as innocent purchasers, which could not be
collaterally attacked even for an alleged jurisdictional defect, un-
less the defect affirmatively appeared in the record. 99
The court held that the trial record affirmatively showed that
service on the defendant was contrary to section 2-203(a), and the
intervenors could not rely upon their purported status as innocent
third party purchasers to prevent collateral attack upon the judg-
ment.oo The court further held that the failure of the authorized
process server to recite in the affidavit any of the requirements of
section 2-203 rendered the affidavit defective. 01 Moreover, the
court stated that the findings of valid service in the judgment can-
not cure the defects. 0 2 A defective affidavit, however, does not
invalidate the service of process if it was actually completed. 0 3
The court, therefore, remanded the matter to the circuit court with
directions to conduct a hearing on whether the substituted service
of process on the defendant was valid.104
IV. VENUE AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Issues concerning the correct application of forum non con-
veniens principles to particular facts frequently arise. Innovative
arguments occasionally raise issues thought to have been settled in
other cases. For example, a plaintiff must plead and prove the resi-
dency of a corporation or the county in which the transaction or
some part of it occurred for venue purposes under sections 2-101
and 2-102 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The question arises,
therefore, whether that same plaintiff should carry the burden of
proving those facts when a defendant challenges venue under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. The Illinois Supreme Court re-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 307, 497 N.E.2d at 1161. The intervening third parties relied on section 2-
1401(e) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-
1401(e)(1985).
100. Thill, 113 I11. 2d at 314, 497 N.E.2d at 1164.
101. Id. at 314, 497 N.E.2d at 1162 (citing Werner v. W.H. Shons Co., 341 Il1. 478,
173 N.E. 486 (1930)).
102. Id. at 314, 497 N.E.2d at 1164.
103. Id. at 312, 497 N.E.2d at 1163.
104. Id. at 317, 497 N.E.2d at 1166.
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cently addressed this question, applying settled principles to arrive
at its determination.
In Weaver v. Midwest Towing, Inc.,"' the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the defendant's motion to dismiss for improper venue or forum
non conveniens. 1° The Weaver court stated that the defendant, as
movant, had the burden of stating specific facts to demonstrate
that the plaintiff's choice of forum was improper or inconve-
nient. 10 7 Furthermore, the court stated that "any doubts arising
from the inadequacy of the record will be resolved against the de-
fendant." 0 8 Because the defendant's motion contained conclusory
statements unsupported by specific facts,"° the court ruled that the
defendant did not successfully demonstrate that the plaintiff's
choice of forum was improper or inconvenient. 01
In Gardner v. International Harvester Co.,"' the Illinois
Supreme Court held that proper venue in St. Clair County was not
established because the defendant did not conduct its usual and
customary business in that county."12 The court recognized that
the defendant conducted a number of activities in St. Clair
County, 1 3 but stated that these activities were incidental to the
105. 116 Ill. 2d 279, 507 N.E.2d 838 (1987).
106. Id. at 286-87, 507 N.E.2d at 841.
107. Id. at 285, 507 N.E.2d at 840.
108. Id. (citing Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Il1. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958, 959
(1984)).
109. For example, the defendant stated that it occasionally did "fleet and barge"
work in the forum. Id. at 286, 507 N.E.2d at 840. The defendant also failed to set out
the identity or location of any witnesses or other sources of relevant proof. Id. at 289,
507 N.E.2d at 842. The court stated that "[tihe defendant did not set out sufficient facts
to enable the trial court to determine" the extent of its business in the forum. Id. at 286,
507 N.E.2d at 841.
110. Id. at 285, 507 N.E.2d at 840. In addition, the Weaver court stated that because
the plaintiff adequately alleged that part of the injury occurred in the forum, and the
defendant did not deny the allegation, venue was proper in the forum. Id. at 287, 507
N.E.2d at 841.
111. 113 Ill. 2d 535, 499 N.E.2d 430 (1986).
112. Id. at 542, 499 N.E.2d at 433. The court relied on its holding in Stambaugh v.
International Harvester Co., 102 Ill. 2d 250, 464 N.E.2d 1011 (1984), in which the court
decided the same issue on substantially the same facts as in the present case. Gardner, 113
Ill. 2d at 539, 499 N.E.2d at 432.
113. Gardner, 113 Ill. 2d at 539-42, 499 N.E.2d at 432-33. The court recognized that
International Harvester: (1) sold products to independent dealers, (2) had sales represent-
atives visit dealers to solicit business, (3) had a cooperative advertising program, (4) had a
wholly owned subsidiary that financed purchases by dealers, (5) purchased products from
companies, (6) required the dealers to perform warranty work on its products, (7) mailed
rebate checks directly to customers, (8) operated a gas cap replacement program, and
(9) accepted payments due its subsidiary in St. Clair County. Id.
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defendant's usual and customary business. 114 The court concluded
that venue was not proper in St. Clair County.1 5
In Bland v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.,11 6 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion
when it denied the defendant's motion to transfer on the basis of
forum non conveniens. In Bland, the plaintiff filed his Federal
Employers' Liability Act ("FELA") 18 claim in the circuit court of
Madison County, Illinois.' 9 The defendant moved to transfer the
case to Macon County on the basis of forum non conveniens 1 20
The Bland court held that the factors offered by the plaintiff in
favor of Madison County as his choice of forum1 21 did not provide
a significant factual connection to the litigation and were relatively
unimportant when compared to the factors offered by the defend-
ant in favor of Macon County. 22 The court stated that Macon
County had significant factual connections to the litigation and
was the more convenient forum. 23 The court also considered sig-
nificant the one-hundred mile distance between the two counties
and the resulting expense to the defendant of transporting wit-
nesses and records. 124 Furthermore, the court stated that a non-
resident plaintiff's choice of forum deserves less deference than
when the plaintiff chooses his home forum. 25 Accordingly, the
court directed the circuit court of Madison County to grant the
defendant's motion to transfer the case to Macon County. 2 6
114. Id. at 542, 499 N.E.2d at 433 (citing Stambaugh, 102 Inl. 2d at 263, 464 N.E.2d
at 1016)). International Harvester's usual and customary business was the design, manu-
facture, advertisement, finance, and sales of its products. Id.
115. Id.
116. 116 Ill. 2d 217, 506 N.E.2d 1291 (1987).
117. Id. at 231, 506 N.E.2d at 1298.
118. 45 U.S.C. § 51-60 (1976).
119. Bland, 116 Ill. 2d at 220-21, 506 N.E.2d at 1292.
120. Id. at 221, 506 N.E.2d at 1292.
121. The plaintiff gave three factors supporting his choice of forum. First, he occa-
sionally worked in Madison County. Second, two of the plaintiff's five treating physi-
cians had offices in Madison County. Third, the defendant transacted business in
Madison County. Id. at 225-26, 506 N.E.2d at 1295.
122. Id. at 225-29, 506 N.E.2d at 1295-96. The defendant claimed that it transacted
business, the plaintiff's injury occurred, the plaintiff was a resident, all of the witnesses
worked, the plaintiff's hospital medical records were held, and the docket was less con-
gested in Macon County. Id. at 221-30, 506 N.E.2d at 1293-97.
123. Id. at 226-29, 506 N.E.2d at 1295-97.
124. Id. at 227, 506 N.E.2d at 1295.
125. Id, at 228, 506 N.E.2d at 1296 (citing Brummett v. Wepfer Marine Inc., 1 1111.
2d 495, 490 N.E.2d 694 (1986); Satkowiak v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 106 Ill. 2d
224, 478 N.E.2d 370 (1985); Weiser v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 98 Ill. 2d 359, 456
N.E.2d 98 (1983)).
126. Id. at 231, 506 N.E.2d at 1298.
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Barnes v. Southern Railway Co. ' 27 also involved a motion to dis-
miss based on forum non conveniens in an FELA case. In Barnes,
the Illinois Supreme Court held that the defendant was not re-
quired to file a motion to dismiss on the basis of forum non con-
veniens within any specific time limit. 2 In Barnes, the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens five
months after it filed its answer.' 29 Although the trial court found
that the case had no connection to St. Clair County, the county in
which it was filed, the trial court denied the motion for untimeli-
ness. ' 30 The trial court reasoned that the defendant waived the fo-
rum non conveniens issue because it was not raised before the date
by which the defendant was required to answer. 131
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forum
non conveniens motion is not waived if filed after the date within
which the defendant must answer.'3 2  The court stated that
although the defendant's delay in filing a forum non conveniens
motion may be considered when deciding the motion, the defend-
ant was not required to file the motion within any specific time
limit. 133
127. 116 Ill. 2d 236, 507 N.E.2d 494 (1987). For a further discussion of Barnes, see
infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.
128. Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 249, 507 N.E.2d at 500. But see infra note 133 for a
discussion of new Supreme Court Rule 187, which establishes a time limit in which a
forum non conveniens motion must be brought.
129. Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 239, 507 N.E.2d at 495-96. The plaintiff's failure to com-
ply with discovery delayed the defendant's filing of its forum non conveniens motion. Id.
at 249, 507 N.E.2d at 500. The plaintiff did not answer the defendant's interrogatories
until a year after they were submitted, and only after the court ordered the plaintiff to
comply with discovery. Id. at 249, 507 N.E.2d at 501.
130. Id. at 240, 507 N.E.2d at 496.
131. Id. at 248, 507 N.E.2d at 500. The trial court relied on Herbert v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co., 130 Ill. App. 3d 624, 474 N.E.2d 848 (5th Dist. 1985). The
Herbert court held that a forum non conveniens motion is analogous to an improper
venue motion and must, therefore, be filed in the same manner, on or before the date
upon which the defendant is required to answer. Id. at 626-27, 474 N.E.2d at 850-51.
132. Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 249, 507 N.E.2d at 500 (citing Grant v. Stark, 96 Ill. App.
3d 297, 421 N.E.2d 268 (1st Dist. 1981)).
133. Id. at 249, 507 N.E.2d at 500 (citing Bell v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Co., 106 Ill. 2d 135, 478 N.E.2d 384 (1985)). The Barnes court noted the recent adoption
of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187, which requires that forum non conveniens motions
after August 1, 1986 be filed not later than ninety days after the last day allowed for filing
that defendant's answer. Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 250, 507 N.E.2d at 501. For a discussion
of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 187, see Kandarus & Wozniak, Civil Procedure, 1985-86
Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CI. L.J. 317, 350-51 (1986).
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V. PLEADINGS AND DISCOVERY
A. Disciplinary Charges
In In re Elias,134 the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether
the defendant was given sufficient notice in the complaint of the
charges against him such that he was not denied due process. 135 In
Elias, the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (the
"ARDC") charged the defendant with commingling and con-
verting clients' funds in six bank accounts. 136 The complaint, how-
ever, did not contain the names of the clients whose funds were
commingled and converted. 37 Relying on In re Ruffalo, 138 the de-
fendant claimed that his right to due process was violated because
the Review Board of the ARDC based its disbarment recommen-
dation on incidents not specifically charged in the complaint.139 In
Ruffalo, a charge was added to the complaint after the defendant
had testified to refute the original charges. 140 The court distin-
guished Ruffalo by stating that the defendant in Elias was con-
fronted not with new charges, but only with evidence supporting
the charges already contained in the complaint.' 4' The court
stated that although the counts in the complaint did not contain
the names of all the clients whose funds were involved in the viola-
tions, the complaint gave the defendant sufficient notice of the na-
ture of the charges because it specifically named the six bank
accounts involved in the violations.'4 2 The court thus held that the
defendant was not denied due process because the complaint filed
by the Administrators of the ARDC gave the defendant sufficient
notice to prepare his defense against the charges. 143
134. 114 11. 2d 321, 499 N.E.2d 1327 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1351 (1987).
135. Id. at 335-36, 499 N.E.2d at 1332-33. Neither the defendant nor the Elias court
explained whether the due process right at issue was based on the federal or state consti-
tution. Id. at 336-37, 499 N.E.2d at 1332-33.
136. Id. at 325-26, 499 N.E.2d at 1328.
137. Id. at 336, 499 N.E.2d at 1333.
138. 390 U.S. 544 (1968). In Ruffalo, the United States Supreme Court held that an
attorney can be disciplined only on charges contained in the complaint. Id. at 551-52.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had been denied due process because he had
not been given the notice necessary to defend against the new charge. Id. at 550-52.
139. Elias, 114 Ill. 2d at 335, 499 N.E.2d at 1332. The charges involved the funds of
individual clients whose names were not mentioned in the complaint. Id. at 336, 499
N.E.2d at 1333.
140. Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 549.
141. Elias, 114 Ill. 2d at 336, 499 N.E.2d at 1333.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 336-37, 499 N.E.2d at 1333.
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B. Experts
In Diminskis v. Chicago Transit Authority,144 the Illinois Appel-
late Court for the First District held that a treating physician is not
considered an expert witness, and, therefore, does not have to be
disclosed as a testifying expert witness pursuant to an Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 220145 request.'" The Diminskis court stated
that the Illinois Supreme Court relied on Rule 26(b)(4) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure 47 when promulgating Rule 220 and,
therefore, Rule 220 should be construed consistent with the federal
rule.1 48 Accordingly, the court held that a treating physician is not
considered an expert retained solely to give his opinion at trial
under Rule 220.149
C. Discovery Sanctions
In Lubbers v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.,150 the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that granting a new
trial to the plaintiff as a discovery sanction against the defendant
for a non-wilful discovery violation was improper and an abuse of
discretion, particularly when the evidence withheld on discovery
was not relevant to the plaintiff's case. 51 In Lubbers, the plaintiff
sued the defendant railroad company seeking damages for injuries
144. 155 Il. App. 3d 585, 508 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist. 1987), appeal granted, 116II1. 2d
552, 515 N.E.2d 105 (1987).
145. ILL. S. Cr. R. 220, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 1A, para. 220 (1985). Supreme Court
Rule 220 states in relevant part:
Expert witness. Where the testimony of experts is reasonably contemplated,
the parties will act in good faith to reasonably:
(i) ascertain the identity of such witnesses, and
(ii) obtain from them the opinions upon which they may be requested
to testify.
Upon interrogatory propounded for that purpose, the party retaining or em-
ploying an expert witness shall be required to state:
(i) the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify;
(ii) his conclusions and opinions and the bases therefor; and
(iii) his qualifications.
Id.
146. Diminskis, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 591, 508 N.E.2d at 220.
147. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4). A treating physician is not considered a testifying
expert under the federal rules. See, e.g., Baran v. Presbyterian University Hospital, 102
F.R.D. 272 (W.D. Penn. 1984).
148. Diminskis, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 590-91, 508 N.E.2d at 219.
149. Id.
150. 147 Ill. App. 3d 501,498 N.E.2d 357 (4th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d
576, 505 N.E.2d 354 (1987). For further a discussion of Lubbers, see infra notes 177-88
and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 519, 498 N.E.2d at 369.
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he suffered when the truck he was driving was hit by the defend-
ant's train.5 2  The defendant filed a counterclaim against the
plaintiff seeking compensation for the damage to the train. 153 At
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found in favor of the defend-
ant.154 In addition, the jury found that the plaintiff's own negli-
gence was a proximate cause of the accident, and, therefore,
awarded the defendant damages on the counterclaim.15 5 Two
years after the judgment, the plaintiff learned that evidence, which
showed improper inspection and post-accident repair of the de-
fendant's crossing signals at the intersection involved in the acci-
dent, was withheld by the defendant during discovery. 156
Thereupon, the plaintiff filed a petition under section 2-1401 of the
Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,1 5 7 requesting that the trial court
vacate the judgment and grant a new trial because of the withheld
evidence.' 8 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had given false
answers to interrogatories that specifically requested the withheld
evidence before trial. 15 9 The trial court vacated the judgment and
awarded the plaintiff a new trial as a sanction against the defend-
ant, finding that the defendant "committed serious and gross viola-
tions of the rules of discovery" regarding the central issue in the
case. 60 The trial court, however, found that the defendant's viola-
tions were not wilful.1 61 The trial court noted that the withheld
evidence would not have affected the plaintiff's position at trial,
but would have allowed him to file an action against the manufac-
turer of the crossing signals.162
The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the
plaintiff a new trial as a sanction for the discovery violations. 63
The appellate court found ample support in the record for the trial
court's conclusion that the defendant's discovery violations were
nonwilful. 64 The appellate court concluded that the trial court
152. Id. at 503, 498 N.E.2d at 359.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 505, 498 N.E.2d at 360.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 505, 498 N.E.2d at 360-61.
157. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1985). Section 2-1401 provides for relief
from final orders and judgments. Id.
158. Lubbers, 147 I1. App. 3d at 505, 498 N.E.2d at 361.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 509, 498 N.E.2d at 364.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 509-10, 498 N.E.2d at 364.
163. Id. at 519, 498 N.E.2d at 370.
164. Id. at 518, 498 N.E.2d at 369. The defendant provided testimony that the dis-
covery violation was the result of a misunderstanding. Id. Additionally, a strike at the
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erred in granting a new trial as a discovery sanction because the
discovery violation was nonwilful. 65  The appellate court stated
that sanctioning a party by granting a new trial should occur only
when the noncompliance with discovery is substantial, wilful, and
in bad faith. 166
VI. JUDGMENTS AND § 2-1401
A. Diligence in Defending Default Judgments
In Smith v. Airoom, Inc.,167 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defend-
ant's petition to vacate the default judgment that the circuit court
entered against the defendant. 16  In Smith, the plaintiff served the
defendant with a summons and complaint, but the defendant failed
to file an answer or appearance to avoid a default judgment. 69
After the trial court denied the defendant's request to vacate the
judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil
Procedure,1 70 the defendant appealed.' 71 The Illinois Supreme
Court held that the defendant had established no valid excuse for
its failure to present diligently a defense in the original action. 7 2
The court therefore held that the defendant lacked due diligence in
defending the case. 173
The defendant in Smith argued that the circuit court should
have relaxed the due diligence standard 7 4 under its equitable pow-
ers because the plaintiff failed to give the defendant notice of the
railroad company at the time of discovery hindered its operations. Id. The appellate court
stated that the plaintiff had failed to show any bad faith on the part of the defendant
during discovery. Id.
165. Id. at 518-19, 498 N.E.2d at 369.
166. Id. at 518, 498 N.E.2d at 369.
167. 114 Ill. 2d 209, 499 N.E.2d 1381 (1986).
168. Id. at 231, 499 N.E.2d at 1391.
169. Id. at 224-25, 499 N.E.2d at 1388.
170. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1985). Section 2-1401 provides for relief
from final orders and judgments. Id.
171. Smith, 114 Ill. 2d at 220, 499 N.E.2d at 1386.
172. Id. The court stated that "Airoom's dilemma is the result of its own negligence
and indifference to or iisregard of the circuit court's process." Id.
173. Id. at 225, 499 N.E.2d at 1388. The allegations of a section 2-1401 petition must
be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and when the petition is controverted by
the respondent's answer, a full and fair evidentiary hearing must be held. Id. at 223, 499
N.E.2d at 1387. Because the petitioner waived the evidentiary hearing, the issue of
whether due diligence was proved by the required quantum of competent evidence was
ascertained on the bases of the pleadings, affidavits, and other supporting evidentiary
materials. Id.
174. Due diligence requires that the section 2-1401 petitioner have a reasonable ex-
cuse for failing to act within the appropriate time. Id. at 222, 499 N.E.2d at 1386.
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default proceedings and the default judgment within thirty days of
its entry. 17  The court disagreed, stating that the plaintiffs were
under no legal duty to give notice of the default proceedings or
judgment to the defendant because no appearance had been en-
tered for Airoom. 7 6
B. Timeliness
In Lubbers v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co., 77 the court
considered whether the plaintiff's amended section 2-1401178 peti-
tion was timely.'7 9 The plaintiff in Lubbers filed his section 2-1401
petitions after the two-year limitations period had run.8 0 In a
separate appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the allega-
tions of the defendant's fraudulent concealment of discoverable ev-
idence contained in plaintiff's original section 2-1401 petition
tolled the section's statute of limitations period. Therefore, the
plaintiff's original motion was timely.18' Because the Illinois
Supreme Court's order provided for liberal amendments to the
original petition, the Fourth District held that the amended peti-
tion also was filed timely.8 2
C. Newly Discovered Evidence
In Lubbers v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.,1 s3 the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fourth District held that the plaintiff was
not entitled to relief under section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of
175. Id. at 226, 499 N.E.2d at 1388.
176. Id. at 226, 499 N.E.2d at 1388-89. The court stated that professional courtesy
"arguably" may require such notice. Id. at 226, 499 N.E.2d at 1388.
177. 147 Ill. App. 3d 501,498 N.E.2d 357 (4th Dist.), appeal denied, 113 Il1. App. 3d
576, 505 N.E.2d 354 (1986). For further a discussion of Lubbers, seesupra notes 150-66,
and infra notes 183-88 and accompanying text.
178. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1985).
179. Lubbers, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 510, 498 N.E.2d at 364.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 511, 498 N.E.2d at 365. The Illinois Supreme Court already had decided
the issue in this case on a separate appeal. Lubbers v. Norfolk and Western Railway Co.,
105 Ill. 2d 201, 473 N.E.2d 955 (1984), later proceeding, 147 Ill. App. 3d 501, 498 N.E.2d
357 (4th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 106 11. Dec. 48, 505 N.E.2d 354 (1987).
182. Lubbers, 147 Il1. App. 3d at 511, 498 N.E.2d at 365. The Lubbers court also
held, relying on People v. B.R. Mackay & Sons, Inc., 141 Ill. App. 3d 137, 490 N.E.2d 74
(1st Dist. 1986) (limited discovery is allowed when a party petitions to vacate a judgment
under section 2-1401), that the circuit court properly allowed both parties to engage in
discovery in connection with the plaintiff's section 2-1401 petition. Lubbers, 147 Ill.
App. 3d at 513, 498 N.E.2d at 366.
183. 147 Ill. App. 3d 501, 498 N.E.2d 357 (4th Dist. 1986), appeal denied, 113 111. 2d
576, 505 N.E.2d 354 (1987). For a further discussion of Lubbers, see supra n, tes 150-66
and 177-82 and accompanying text.
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Civil Procedure because he failed to show that the withheld evi-
dence would have changed the decision.'" Two years after the
judgment against him, the plaintiff in Lubbers discovered evidence
that the defendant had not disclosed to the plaintiff during discov-
ery. 85 On the basis of the withheld evidence, the plaintiff filed a
petition to vacate the judgment under section 2-1401.86 The ap-
pellate court refused to grant section 2-1401 relief, reasoning that
the plaintiff failed to prove that if he had received the information
withheld by the defendant, it would have prevented the judgment
against him. 187 The appellate court stated that there was no causal
connection between the withheld information and the accident that
caused the injuries to the plaintiff and the defendant.188
VII. NEW TRIAL STANDARD
In Junker v. Ziegler,8 9 the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
manifest weight of the evidence standard should be applied by the
courts in determining whether a new trial should be granted in
comparative negligence cases. 90 In Junker, the trial court used the
manifest weight standard when considering the plaintiff's post-trial
motion for a new trial.' 91 The defendant suggested that a standard
more deferential to the jury's verdict should be used in compara-
tive negligence cases. 92 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, re-
fused to modify the standard that it has applied consistently, 93 and
184. Lubbers, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 516, 498 N.E.2d at 368 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110, para. 2-1401 (1985)).
185. Id. at 505, 498 N.E.2d at 360-61. The alleged withheld information included
records of inspection and repair of crossing signals before and after the accident. Id.
186. Id. at 505-06, 498 N.E.2d at 361-62. The petitioners alleged that the defendant
fraudulently had given incomplete and false answers to interrogatories and falsified and
failed to turn over various records when requested. Id.
187. Id. at 516, 498 N.E.2d at 368. The court cited Ostendorf v. International Har-
vester Co., 89 Ill. 2d 273, 433 N.E.2d 253 (1982), for the proposition that, in order to
receive section 2-1401 relief, the plaintiff must show that "if the ground for relief had
been known at trial, it would have prevented the entry of judgment against him." Lub-
bers, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 498 N.E.2d at 367 (citing Ostendorf, 89 Ill. 2d at 283, 433
N.E.2d at 257).
188. Lubbers, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 498 N.E.2d at 367. The appellate court stated
that, because the plaintiff was never advised that the crossing lights might flash when no
train was coming, he could not have relied on such information. Therefore, it could not
have been a cause of the accident. Id.
189. 113 11. 2d 332, 498 N.E.2d 1135 (1986).
190. Id. at 339, 498 N.E.2d at 1138.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Jardine v. Rubloff, 73 Ill. 2d 31, 44, 382 N.E.2d 232, 234 (1978)
(when ruling on a motion for a new trial, the trial judge should consider whether the
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence)).
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held that the circuit court used the proper standard in considering
the motion for a new trial.' 94
VIII. APPEALS
A. Timeliness
In Barnes v. Southern Railway Co.,'95 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the defendant's petition for leave to appeal the denial of
its motion to reconsider based on forum non conveniens was timely
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(1),' 96 and, therefore,
that the appellate court erred in dismissing it for lack of jurisdic-
tion. 97 In Barnes, both the defendant's original motion to dismiss
and its subsequent motion to reconsider were denied by the circuit
court.198 The defendant then petitioned the appellate court for
leave to appeal the denial of its motion to reconsider. 99 The appel-
late court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it
was not filed within thirty days of the denial of the defendant's
original motion to dismiss.200 The appellate court reasoned that
the thirty-day limit for filing a petition for leave to appeal from an
order denying a motion to dismiss based upon forum non con-
v eniens was not tolled by filing a motion to reconsider.2 °'
The defendant, however, did not argue that the thirty-day period
194. Id.
195. 116 Ill. 2d 236, 507 N.E.2d 494 (1987). For a further discussion of Barnes, see
supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
196. ILL. S. Cr. R. 306(aXl), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 306(a)(1) (1985).
Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(1) states in relevant part:
Petition for Leave to Appeal. An appeal may be taken in the following cases
only on the allowance by the Appellate Court of a petition for leave to appeal:
(ii) from an order of the circuit court denying a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of forum non conveniens; or from an order of the circuit court allowing
or denying a motion to transfer a case to another county within this State on
such grounds.
The petition shall contain a statement of the facts of the case, supported by
reference to the record, and of the grounds for the appeal. It shall be dupli-
cated, served, and filed in the Appellate court in accordance with the require-
ments for briefs within 30 days after the entry of the order.
Id.
197. Barnes, 116 Il. 2d at 242, 506 N.E.2d at 497.
198. Id. at 240, 506 N.E.2d at 496.
199. Id. at 241, 507 N.E.2d at 497.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 241-42, 507 N.E.2d at 497. The appellate court relied on Leet v, Louisville
and Nashville Railroad Co., 131 Ill. App. 3d 763, 475 N.E.2d 1390 (5th Dist. 1985) (the
30 day period within which to file a petition for leave to appeal from an order denying a
motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens may not be tolled by filing a motion to
reconsider the denial).
Loyola University Law Journal
was tolled. 2 Instead, the defendant argued that, because the de-
fendant's motion to reconsider presented new matter for considera-
tion, it was an independent and original motion to dismiss that was
independently appealable. °3 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed,
holding that the defendant's petition for leave to appeal from the
denial of its motion to reconsider was essentially a new and origi-
nal motion, which was filed within the thirty-day time limit.2°4
Therefore, the appellate court erred in dismissing the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction. °5
B. Eligibility
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 318(a) 206 permits "any appellee, re-
spondent, or co-party" to an appeal from the appellate to the
supreme court to seek any relief available based on the record on
appeal without filing a separate petition for leave to appeal.20 7 In
Penkava v. Kasbohm,2 ° s the Illinois Supreme Court held that the
plaintiff was not eligible for relief under Rule 318(a).2°9 In
Penkava, the plaintiff sued defendants Kasbohm, Hon, and North-
west Hospital for medical malpractice. 21 0 The trial court granted
the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint because of the ex-
piration of the statute of limitations.21' On the plaintiff's appeal,
the appellate court reversed and remanded only the claim against
Hon.21 The Illinois Supreme Court granted Hon's petition for
leave to appeal the reversal of the dismissal of the claim against
her, but denied the plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal the af-
firmance of the dismissal of her claims against Kasbohm and
Northwest Hospital. 21 3 The plaintiff then filed a cross-appeal that
202. Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 252, 507 N.E.2d at 497. The defendant argued before the
Illinois Supreme Court that Leet was inapplicable to the present case. Id.
203. Id. at 244, 507 N.E.2d at 498 (citing Kemner v. Monsanto, 112 Ill. 2d 223, 492
N.E.2d 1327 (1986) (raising new matter in a motion to reconsider creates a new and
independently appealable motion)). For a discussion of Kemner, see Kandaras & Woz-
niak, Civil Procedure, 1985-86 Illinois Law Survey, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 317, 332-33
(1986).
204. Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 247, 507 N.E.2d at 499.
205. Id.
206. ILL. S. CT. R. 318(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 318(a) (1985).
207. Id.
208. 117 Ill. 2d 149, 510 N.E.2d 883 (1987). For a further discussion of Penkava, see
supra notes 78-88 and accompanying text.
209. Penkava, 117 Ill. 2d at 154, 510 N.E.2d at 885.
210. Id. at 151, 510 N.E.2d at 883.
211. Id. at 151, 510 N.E.2d at 883-84.
212. Id. at 151, 510 N.E.2d at 884.
213. Id.
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was the same as her petition for leave to appeal which had been
denied.21 4 She claimed that Rule 318(a) granted her the right to
this cross-appeal. 215  The Illinois Supreme Court, however, dis-
missed the plaintiff's cross-appeal.21 6 The court stated that, for
purposes of the cross-appeal, the plaintiff must be either an appel-
lee, respondent, or co-party, as required by Rule 318(a).21 7 The
court reasoned that, because the plaintiff's cross-appeal involved
Kasbohm and Northwest Hospital, neither of whom appealed, the
plaintiff was not an appellee, respondent, or co-party under Rule
318(a) for purposes of the appeal. 21 8 The court, therefore, dis-
missed the cross-appeal.21 9
IX. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
A. Finality of Judgment
The doctrine of collateral estoppel can be asserted to prevent the
"relitigation of previously adjudicated claims" 220 when three crite-
ria are met.221 First, the issues in both cases must be identical.222
Second, the judgment in the previous case must have been on the
merits and final.223 Finally, "the party against whom estoppel is
asserted must be a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication. 224 In Ballweg v. City of Springfield,225 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel did not
apply because the judgment of the previously adjudicated case was
not final. 6
214. Id. at 154, 510 N.E.2d at 885.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Ballweg v. City of Springfield, 114 Il. 2d 107, 113, 499 N.E.2d 1373, 1375
(1986) (citing Morris v. Union Oil Co., 96 Ill. App. 3d 148, 421 N.E.2d 278 (5th Dist.
1981)). For further discussions of Ballweg, see the Evidence and Torts articles of this
Survey.
221. Id. at 113, 499 N.E.2d at 1375 (citing Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v.
Pollution Control Board, 78 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 398 N.E.2d 9, 12 (1979)).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. 114 Ill. 2d 107,499 N.E.2d 1373 (1986). For a further discussion of Ballweg, see
infra notes 248-59 and accompanying text.
226. Id. at 113, 499 N.E.2d at 1375. In Ballweg, two girls were killed in a boating
accident. Id. at 111, 499 N.E.2d at 1375. Separate actions were brought on behalf of each
of the decedents. Id. The cases involved identical issues and defendants. Id. The defend-
ants were found liable in the first action. Ogg v. City of Springfield, 121 Ill. App. 3d 25,
458 N.E.2d 1331 (4th Dist. 1984). The plaintiff in Ballweg claimed that the finding of
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In Ballweg, the court stated that for the purposes of collateral
estoppel, a case is final only if the potential for appellate review has
been exhausted.22 7 Because the previously adjudicated case was on
appeal during the pendency of the motion, the court held that the
trial court properly denied the application of collateral estoppel be-
cause of lack of finality.22 8
B. Application
In Kahle v. John Deere Co.,229 the Illinois Appellate Court for
the First District held that the trial court was not bound in the
refiled case by the determination of the identical motion to transfer
venue in the original case.23° In Kahle, the plaintiff originally filed
his case in Cook County.23I The trial court then granted the de-
fendant's motion to transfer venue to another county.232 The
plaintiff was later granted a voluntary dismissal under section 2-
1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.233 Subsequently, the
plaintiff, under section 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 234 refiled the same lawsuit in Cook County.235 The defend-
ants moved to transfer venue to another county as they had in the
original case.236 After the trial court struck the motion and denied
reconsideration, the defendants were granted a supervisory order
by the supreme court.237 The supreme court ordered the trial court
to vacate its order striking defendant's motion to transfer venue,
and further, to reassign the case to a different judge to determine
the venue question.238 Upon remand and reassignment, the trial
judge ruled that he was bound by res judicata, collateral estoppel,
or the law of the case by the determination of the venue issue in the
liability in Ogg collaterally estopped the defendants from denying liability in the second
case. Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 113, 499 N.E.2d at 1375.
227. Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 113, 499 N.E.2d at 1375 (citing Relph v. Board of Educa-
tion, 84 Ill. 2d 436, 420 N.E.2d 147 (1981)).
228. Id. at 113, 499 N.E.2d at 1375.
229. 151 Ill. App. 3d 139, 502 N.E.2d 1172 (1st Dist. 1986), appeal granted, 108 Ill.
Dec. 418, 508 N.E.2d 729 (1987).
230. Kahle, 151 I1. App. 3d at 141, 502 N.E.2d at 1174.
231. Id. at 139, 502 N.E.2d at 1172-73.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 139-40, 502 N.E.2d at 1173 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009(1985)).
234. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1985).
235. Kahle, 151 Il1. App. 3d at 140, 502 N.E.2d at 1173.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
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original case.239
On appeal, the appellate court stated that such a ruling is incon-
sistent with the legislative purpose behind section 2-1009, which is
to secure an absolute right to voluntary dismissal before trial or
hearing. 2"' Furthermore, the court stated that a literal reading of
the supervisory order directs the trial court to make a de novo de-
termination of the venue issue on the merits. 24' The court, there-
fore, held that the determination of the motion to transfer venue in
the voluntarily dismissed case did not bind the court when ruling
on the identical motion after the case was refiled.242
X. SETTLEMENT AND CONTRIBUTION
The public policy of this state supports and encourages the com-
promise settlement of disputed claims because such settlements
promote peace, prevent unnecessary litigation, and are conducive
to the termination of litigation already in progress.243 Some statu-
tory provisions govern the implementation of settlements because
the validity of a settlement that terminates the rights of others who
are not parties to the settlement can lead to drastic results. Never-
theless, the courts have been reluctant to add limitations to a settle-
ment or statute because such action would cause those who wish to
end litigation to be "wary and uncertain of what they could accom-
plish by settlement."12"
The Illinois courts continue to be concerned with settlements
under the Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act,245 the provi-
sions of which have the potential for authorizing denials of contri-
bution under given circumstances. 2" Among issues receiving
continuing consideration is whether a settlement was entered into
by the parties in "good faith." The Illinois Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors Act releases a tortfeasor who settles in "good
faith" from all liability for contribution to a joint tortfeasor.247
In Ballweg v. City of Springfield,4 8 the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the settlement between the plaintiff and Henrici, the
239. Id.
240. Id. at 141, 502 N.E.2d at 1173.
241. Id. at 140, 502 N.E.2d at 1173.
242. Id. at 141, 502 N.E.2d at 1174.
243. See Rakowski v. Lucente, 104 Il1. 2d 317, 472 N.E.2d 791 (1984).
244. Id. at 325, 472 N.E.2d at 795.
245. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, paras. 301-305 (Supp. 1987).
246. See, e.g., Rakowski, 104 Ill. 2d 317, 472 N.E.2d at 791 (1984).
247. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 302(c)(d) (Supp. 1987).
248. 114 11. 2d 107, 499 N.E.2d 1373 (1986). For a further discussion of Ballweg, see
supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
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third-party defendant, was made in "good faith. ' 249 In Ballweg,
two of the defendants filed a third-party complaint seeking contri-
bution from Henrici.250 Before trial, however, Henrici entered into
a settlement agreement with the plaintiff.251 Because the circuit
court found that the settlement was made in "good faith, ' 2 2 it dis-
missed the contribution claim against Henrici.253
In the appellate court, 254 the defendants argued that the trial
court erred in dismissing their contribution claim against Hen-
rici.2" They argued that the settlement agreement between the
plaintiff and Henrici lacked "good faith" because at the time of the
settlement, the plaintiff's claims against Henrici had expired under
the statute of limitations.256 The appellate court held that, because
the plaintiff's claims against Henrici had expired, the settlement
agreement lacked consideration and, therefore, was not made in
good faith.257
The supreme court reversed, holding that the settlement agree-
ment was made in good faith because the plaintiff gave considera-
tion for the settlement.258 The court reasoned that Henrici was still
potentially liable to the plaintiff because Henrici had never raised
the defense of the statute of limitations to bar any of the claims the
plaintiff might have brought against him.259
249. Id. at 123, 499 N.E.2d at 1380.
250. Id. at 121, 499 N.E.2d at 1379.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 111-12, 499 N.E.2d at 1375.
254. Baliweg v. City of Springfield, 130 Ill. App. 3d 241, 473 N.E.2d 342 (4th Dist.
1984).
255. Id. at 251, 473 N.E.2d at 348.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 252, 473 N.E.2d at 349 (citing LeMaster v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 110
Ill. App. 3d 729, 442 N.E.2d 1367 (5th Dist. 1982)). The LeMaster court held that a
settlement is not made in "good faith" when it lacks consideration. LeMaster, 110 Ill.
App. 3d at 736, 442 N.E.2d at 1373.
258. Ballweg, 114 Ill. 2d at 122, 499 N.E.2d at 1380. The court also noted that the
trial judge was involved in the settlement process and had approved of the settlement. Id.
at 122-23, 499 N.E.2d at 1380.
259. Id. at 122, 499 N.E.2d at 1380 (citing Doyle v. Rhodes, 101111. 2d 1, 461 N.E.2d
382 (1984)). The Doyle court held that "the potential for tort liability exists until the
defense [of the statute of limitations] is established." Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d at 10-11, 461
N.E.2d at 387.
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XI. JUDICIAL DISCRETION: THE JURY
A. Voir Dire
In Kingston v. Turner,26 the Illinois Supreme Court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting voir
dire.26 1 In Kingston, the plaintiffs sued the owners of two taverns
under the Liquor Control Act,262 seeking recovery for injuries re-
ceived in an automobile accident.263 During voir dire, without limi-
tation as to scope, the trial court allowed both parties' counsel to
question all of the prospective jurors.264 After acceptance of the
panel by both parties, plaintiff's counsel discovered potential biases
in two of the four jurors265 and asked the trial court to reopen voir
dire for further questioning of the two jurors.266 The trial court
refused to reopen voir dire, stating that the panel must remain as
accepted.267
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court on the grounds that the plaintiff's counsel had ample oppor-
tunity to question the jurors about their biases before tendering
them.268 The court stated that plaintiff's counsel waived any objec-
tions to these two jurors when he tendered the panel.269
B. Prejudicial Events During Trial
In Campbell v. Fox,270 the Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new
trial because the jury had been unduly influenced by the defend-
260. 115 Ill. 2d 445, 505 N.E.2d 320 (1987). For a further discussion of Kingston, see
infra notes 283-96 and accompanying text.
261. Kingston, 115 111. 2d at 465, 505 N.E.2d at 329.
262. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (1981). Section 135, in relevant part, states:
Every person who is injured in person or property by any intoxicated person,
has a right of action in his or her own name, severally or jointly, against any
person who by selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of such
person.
Id.
263. Kingston, 115 I1l. 2d at 452, 505 N.E.2d at 322-23.
264. Id. at 465, 505 N.E.2d at 329.
265. The attorney discovered that one juror's father had owned a bar, and another
juror's father had tended bar. Id. at 452-53, 505 N.E.2d at 323.
266. Id. at 453, 505 N.E.2d at 323.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 465, 505 N.E.2d at 329. During voir dire, plaintiff's counsel asked the first
panel of jurors whether they had any relatives who were associated with dram shops. Id.
at 452, 505 N.E.2d at 323. Plaintiff's counsel, however, failed to ask the same question of
the two jurors on the second panel, which was the panel tendered and accepted for the
trial. Id.
269. Id. at 465, 505 N.E.2d at 329.
270. 113 Ill. 2d 354, 498 N.E.2d 1145 (1986).
Loyola University Law Journal
ant's assistance of a juror who had collapsed during opening state-
ments at trial.2 1 In Campbell, the plaintiff brought a medical
malpractice action against the defendant, Dr. Fox. 272  During
opening statements at trial, one of the jurors collapsed in the jury
box.273 The defendant came to the juror's aid by carrying her from
the jury box to the counsel's table where she regained conscious-
ness.274 The jury was removed from the courtroom, and
paramedics took the ill juror to the hospital.275 The trial court de-
nied the plaintiff's motion for a mistrial because of the potential for
prejudice of the jury after the events.276 The trial court, however,
conducted limited voir dire to determine if the jurors had been
prejudiced by the events.271 Because all of the jurors stated that
they were not prejudiced and could still be fair and impartial, the
trial continued, resulting in a verdict for the defendant.278
The supreme court concluded that the events at trial prejudiced
the jury in the defendant's favor.27 9 The court doubted whether
the jurors could make an impartial evaluation of the credibility of
the defendant's testimony.280 Because the credibility of the parties
was the pivotal factor in the case,28 ' the court held that a new trial
was required.282
XII. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: OBJECTIONS ON APPEAL
In Kingston v. Turner, s3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a
party is not limited, on an appeal regarding the validity of the trial
271. Id. at 359, 498 N.E.2d at 1147.
272. Id. at 356, 498 N.E.2d at 1146.
273. Id. at 357, 498 N.E.2d at 1146.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 358, 498 N.E.2d at 1146.
277. Id. at 358, 498 N.E.2d at 1146-47. The trial court read two questions tendered
by the plaintiff's counsel: (1) "Do you still feel you can be fair and impartial?" and
(2) "Did the treatment rendered to the juror by Dr. Fox prejudice you in any way?" Id.
at 358, 498 N.E.2d at 1147.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 358-59, 498 N.E.2d at 1147.
280. Id. at 359, 498 N.E.2d at 1147.
281. Id. The case centered on what the defendant told the plaintiff during the plain-
tiff's appointments. Id. at 357, 498 N.E.2d at 1146. The plaintiff testified that the defend-
ant did not tell her that the left prosthesis would have to be removed. Id. Her testimony
was contradicted by the defendant and his nurse who both testified that the plaintiff "re-
fused to allow the defendant to remove the prosthesis" when the defendant told her it had
to be removed. Id.
282. Id.
283. 115 Ill. 2d 445, 505 N.E.2d 320 (1987). For a further discussion of Kingston, see
supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
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court's refusal to tender a jury instruction, if the ruling is correct
on any ground, to raising only those objections made during the
instruction conference.284 In Kingston, the plaintiffs sued the own-
ers of two taverns under the Liquor Control Act. 28 5 During the
conference on jury instructions, the plaintiffs tendered an instruc-
tion that purported to define the term "cause of intoxication" used
in the Liquor Control Act.28 6 Both defendants objected to the
instruction on the grounds that the definition contained therein
was contrary to the provisions of the Liquor Control Act.287 The
trial court refused to give the instruction.288
On appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendants
presented their initial objection to the instruction raised at trial as
well as a number of other objections not raised at trial.289 The
plaintiffs argued that under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239(b),290
the defendants may raise, in this appeal, only the objection that
they specifically made during the instruction conference. 29' The
Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.292 The supreme court stated
that if the trial court's refusal of a jury instruction was correct on
any ground, it will stand even if based on an incorrect ground at
trial.293 The supreme court, therefore, held that it may consider all
of the defendants' specific objections to the instruction made on
this appeal.294 Relying on Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co. v. Northern
Illinois Gas Co. ,295 the supreme court reasoned that without such a
holding, a party at trial would be burdened with raising all possible
284. Kingston, 115 Il1. 2d at 456, 505 N.E.2d at 324.
285. Id. at 452, 505 N.E.2d at 322. For the relevant text of the Liquor Control Act,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, para. 135 (1981), see supra note 262.
286. Kingston, 115 Ill. 2d at 453, 505 N.E.2d at 323. The tendered instruction was
not contained in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions. Id.
287. Id. at 454, 505 N.E.2d at 323.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 455-56. 505 N.E.2d at 324.
290. ILL. S. Cr. R. 239(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I OA, para. 239(b)(1985). Rule
239(b) states in pertinent part:
Counsel may object at the conference on instructions to any instruction pre-
pared at the court's direction, regardless of who prepared it, and the court shall
rule on these objections as well as objections to other instructions. The grounds
of the objections shall be particularly specified..
Id.
291. Kingston, 115 Ill. 2d at 455, 505 N.E.2d at 324.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 455-56, 505 N.E.2d at 324.
294. Id. at 456, 505 N.E.2d at 324.
295. 61 Ill. 2d 6, 329 N.E.2d 228 (1985). Pioneer held that if the trial court was
correct in rejecting a tendered instruction on any ground, the decision will stand even if
originally based on an improper ground. Id. at 13, 329 N.E.2d at 231.
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objections to tendered jury instructions even after the trial court
had sustained one of the objections.296
XIII. CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS
In Leonard C. Arnold, Ltd. v. Northern Trust Co.,297 the Illinois
Supreme Court held that contingent fee arrangements entered by a
guardian on a minor's behalf are enforceable unless the court de-
termines that the terms are unreasonable. 298 The court stated that
prior approval of the agreement by the trial court is unnecessary.
299
In addition, the Arnold court held that Circuit Court Rule
9.20(e) 3co of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit is valid. 30 ' Rule 9.20(e)
provides that the attorney's fees received in the settlement of cases
involving personal injuries to minors or incompetents can not ex-
ceed twenty-five percent of the minors' or incompetents' settlement
recovery, unless the attorney can substantiate by itemization a
greater fee.302 The court stated that this procedural rule is consis-
tent with the requirement that contingent fee arrangements made
on a minor's behalf be reasonable.30 3 The court held that it was
imperative that the local rule not be interpreted to limit attorneys
to a quantum meruit recovery. 3° 4 The rule also must not be inter-
preted so as to require the attorneys to prove the reasonableness of
a fee of twenty-five percent or less in every case.
296. Kingston, 115 Ill. 2d at 455-56, 505 N.E.2d at 324. In addition, the Kingston
court recognized that needless repetition in jury instructions should be avoided. Id. at
458, 505 N.E.2d at 325-26. Similarly, the practice of paraphrasing language from court
opinions for use as jury instructions should be avoided because the decision may have too
broad or narrow an application. Id. at 460, 505 N.E.2d at 326.
297. 116 11. 2d 157, 506 N.E.2d 1279 (1987).
298. Id. at 166, 506 N.E.2d at 1282.
299. Id. at 165-66, 506 N.E.2d at 1282.
300. Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court Rule 9.20(e).
301. Arnold, 116 Ill. 2d at 167, 506 N.E.2d at 1283.
302. Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court Rule 9.20(e).
303. Arnold, 116 Ill. 2d at 169, 506 N.E.2d at 1284.
304. Id. Quantum meruit means the reasonable value of the services rendered.
Black's Law Dictionary 1119 (5th ed. 1968).
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XIV. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN RULES AND
STATUTORY LAW
30
A. New or Modified Illinois Supreme Court Rules
1. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 203: Where Depositions
May Be Taken
Effective August 1, 1987, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 203306
was amended.30 7 Amended Rule 203 provides that attorneys shall
take depositions of plaintiffs in the county where the action is
pending, unless otherwise agreed.308 The rule also provides that
attorneys shall take depositions of other deponents in the county
where they reside, are employed or transact business.309 The rule
provides that the attorney and the deponent may agree on an alter-
native location at which to take the deposition.310 Most signifi-
cantly, the rule provides that the court may, in its discretion, order
only a party or officer, director, or employee of a party to appear to
be deposed at any place designated by the court.311
2. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 206: Method of Taking
Depositions on Oral Examination
Effective August 1, 1987, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 206312
was amended by the addition of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2).313 An
explanation of the amendments appears in the committee com-
ments. Amended Rule 206(a)(1) provides that when a party names
a corporation, partnership, association, or governmental agency as
a deponent in the notice and subpoena, and describes with reason-
able particularity the matters on which examination is requested,
the deponent organization must designate the person or persons
that will testify for it in the deposition.31 4 The organization may
set forth the matters on which each designated person will tes-
tify.315 The designated persons must testify to matters known or
305. See also Wright, Trial Briefs, 33 I.S.B.A. Newsletter 1 (1987).
306. ILL. S. Cr. R. 203, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 203 (Supp. 1987).
307. Id.
308. Id. The change was effected in order to protect nonparty witnesses from unwar-
ranted interference with their personal or business activities when amended Rule 206(a)
is employed. The court may no longer designate by order an alternative place to depose a
non-party. See ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 206(a) committee comment (1987).
309. ILL. S. Cr. R. 203, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 203 (Supp. 1987).
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. ILL. S. CT. R. 206, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1l0A, para. 206 (1987).
313. Id.
314. Id. at para. 206(a)(1).
315. Id.
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reasonably available to the organization.316 Amended Rule
206(a)(2) requires that a party who intends to audio-visually rec-
ord the deposition must advise all parties to the deposition of that
fact in the notice.317 The amended Committee Comments state
that the procedure under the amended Rule 206(a)(1) is virtually
the same as that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b). 31 '8 They
also state that the purpose of the amended rule is to discourage
representative depositions, and that the amended rule is not in-
tended to expand the court's subpoena power.31 9
3. Committee Comment 204(c): Issuance of
Subpoenas on Doctors
New committee comment to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
204(C) 320 became effective July 8, 1986.321 The new comment states
that rule 204(c) implies that the trial court, in its discretion, may
refuse to issue a subpoena for deposition of a physician or surgeon
unless the moving party makes a preliminary showing of good
cause for the subpoena.322 The movant must be able to show that
although he has received the medical records in the case, there is a
necessity for the deposition.323
4. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 282: Representation of
Corporations in Small Claims Cases
Effective August 1, 1987, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 282324
was amended by the addition of subsection (b).325 Amended Rule
282(b) provides that a corporation cannot appear as a plaintiff, as-
signee, subrogee, or counterclaimant in a small claims case without
counsel.326 A corporation, however, may represent itself as a de-
fendant in such proceedings, when the claim does not exceed fif-
teen hundred dollars.327 By definition, a small claim is a civil
316. Id.
317. Id. at para. 206(a)(2).
318. Id. at committee comments.
319. Id.
320. ILL. S. Cr. R. 204(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 204(c) committee com-
ment (Supp. 1987).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. ILL. S. Cr. R. 282, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 282 (Supp. 1987).
325. Id.
326. Id. at para. 282(b).
327. Id.
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action for money not in excess of twenty-five hundred dollars.3 21
When a small claim exceeds fifteen hundred dollars, therefore, an
attorney must be employed to represent a corporate defendant.
Justice Simon's dissent to Rule 282(b) 3 29 was filed on July 13,
1987.330 Justice Simon stated that Rule 282(b) conflicts with sec-
tion 2-416 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure,331 which autho-
rizes corporations to represent themselves as plaintiffs and
defendants in small claims cases.332 Justice Simon argued that the
courts will be confronted with the problem of deciding which au-
thority, the legislature or supreme court, they will follow when
dealing with these inconsistent rules.333
5. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 286: Informal Hearings in
Small Claims Cases
Effective August 1, 1987, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 286334
was amended by the addition of subsection (b). 335 Amended Rule
286(b) provides that the court, on its own motion or that of any
party, may decide any small claims case under one thousand dol-
lars by means of an informal hearing.336 The rule also provides
that the court, in such an informal hearing, may relax the rules of
procedure and evidence, call anyone present to testify, and conduct
direct and cross-examination of any witness or party. 37 The court
is also required to render judgment at the conclusion of the hearing
and explain the reasons for the judgment to all parties. 338
6. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 287: Leave to File Motions in
Small Claims Cases
Small claims rules were intended to provide procedures that
would simplify and make inexpensive the disposition of small
claims. Rulings on procedures that are not specifically prescribed
by these rules sometimes made the handling of those cases as diffi-
cult and expensive as in other cases. Remedial action by the adop-
tion of even more constricting rules of procedure should ameliorate
328. ILL. S. Cr. R. 281, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 281 (1985).
329. ILL. S. Cr. R. 282(b), 107 I11. 2d xcv, xcvi (1986) (Simon, J., dissenting).
330. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
331. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2416 (1985).
332. ILL. S. Cr. R. 282(b), 107 Ill. 2d xcv, xcvi (1986) (Simon, J., dissenting).
333. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
334. ILL. S. CT. R. 286, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 286 (Supp. 1987).
335. Id.
336. Id. at para. 286(b).
337. Id.
338. Id.
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this situation. Effective August 1, 1987, Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 287339 was amended by the addition of subsection (b).34°
Amended Rule 287(b) provides that no party may file a motion in
a small claims case without first obtaining leave of the court.341
The amendment to the committee comments to Rule 287(b)342
states th At the purpose of the Supreme Court Rules in small claims
cases is to simplify procedures and reduce costs. 343 The comments
also state that the court should permit motions in small claims
cases only if dispositive of the claim and in the interest of justice.3 "
7. Illinois Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95:
Mandatory Arbitration
Enabling legislation enacted by the Illinois General Assembly
granted the Illinois Supreme Court the authority to adopt rules
implementing the Mandatory Arbitration System.345 The legisla-
tion was intended to expedite, with less expensive procedures, civil
cases when the claim asserted does not exceed fifteen thousand dol-
lars, or when the circuit court, at a pretrial conference, determines
that the amount in controversy does not exceed that amount.3 6
The Illinois Supreme Court, through its implementing rules,
makes arbitration procedures mandatory only in those judicial cir-
cuits that elect to utilize this method, when approved by the
supreme court, or in those circuits directed to so utilize this system
of dispute resolution.347 New Illinois Supreme Court Rules 86
through 95,348 known as the Mandatory Arbitration Rules, became
effective June 1, 1987 .349 New Rule 86 provides that civil actions
solely involving money damages less than fifteen thousand dollars
are subject to mandatory arbitration. 3-° Even if the claim is for
more than fifteen thousand dollars, the court may order the case to
arbitration if the court believes the claim's value is less than fifteen
thousand dollars.351 In addition, Rule 86 provides that the Illinois
339. ILL. S. Cr. R. 287, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 287 (1987).
340. Id.
341. Id. at para. 287(b).
342. Id. at committee comments.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1001A et seq. (1985).
346. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1001A (1985).
347. ILL. S. Cr. R. 86(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 86(a) (Supp. 1987).
348. ILL. S. CT. RULES 86-95, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, paras. 86-95 (Supp. 1987).
349. Id.
350. Id. at para. 86(b). The Illinois Supreme Court must approve of the adoption of
this procedure by each judicial circuit. Id. at para. 86(a).
351. Id. at para. 86(b).
[Vol. 19
Civil Procedure
Code of Civil Procedure and Supreme Court Rules apply to the
arbitration proceedings whenever the Mandatory Arbitration
Rules do not provide guidance. 3 2 The committee comments to
Rule 86353 state that any party may reject the arbitrator's decision
and proceed to trial.354
Rule 87 provides that an arbitration panel of one to three mem-
bers355 shall be appointed from a list of practicing members of the
bar and retired judges.356 The rule also provides that the chairman
of the panel must either be a retired judge or have practiced law for
at least three years.357 In addition, the rule provides for the com-
pensation of the arbitrators.358
New Rule 88 provides that at least sixty days notice of the date,
time, and place of the arbitration hearing must be given to the par-
ties.359 In addition, Rule 88 requires that the hearing must be
scheduled and held within one year of the filing date, unless the
court continues the matter upon the showing by a party of good
cause.360 The committee comments to Rule 88 state that the time
limitation is not intended to be a period of limitation, but rather, a
reasonable expectation.361
New Rule 89 provides that all discovery must be completed
prior to the arbitration hearing.362 Furthermore, :Rule 89 provides
that, except by leave of the court for good cause shown, the court
shall not permit any discovery after the hearing for the purpose of
gathering new evidence for trial.363 The committee comments to
Rule 89 suggest that good cause is shown for additional discovery
when a change in circumstances has occurred between the arbitra-
tion hearing and a requested trial date.3 4
New Rule 90 provides the evidentiary rules for arbitration hear-
ings. 365 Rule 90(a) provides that the arbitrators have the power to
352. Id. at para. 86(a).
353. Id. at committee comments.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 87(b). The arbitration panel consists of three members unless the parties
agree to a lesser number. Id.
356. Id. at para. 87(a).
357. Id. at para. 87(b).
358. Id. at para. 87(e). Each arbitrator receives one hundred dollars for each half-
day of service. Id.
359. Id. at para. 88.
360. Id.
361. Id. at committee comments.
362. Id. at para. 89.
363. Id.
364. Id. at committee comments.
365. Id. at para. 90.
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administer oaths, determine evidentiary issues and decide the facts
and law of the case.366 Subsection (b) provides that the established
evidentiary rules in Illinois are applicable to arbitration hear-
ings.367 Subsection (c) provides for the presumptive admissability
of documents into evidence without foundation or proof as long as
the adverse party is given thirty days written notice with a copy of
the document.368 Subsection (d) provides that a party may use the
written opinion or testimony of an expert witness at the hearing as
long as the adverse party is given thirty days written notice with a
statement notifying the adverse party of the expert's name, qualifi-
cations, subject matter, basis of conclusions, and opinion.369 Sub-
section (e) provides that any party, in conformity with section 2-
1101 of the Code of Civil Procedure,37 ° may subpoena the maker of
a document admissable under subsection (c), and may examine the
maker at the hearing as if on cross-examination.371 Subsection (f)
provides that section 2-1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure 372 ap-
plies to arbitration hearings.373 Subsection (g) similarly provides
that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 237374 applies to arbitration
366. Id. at para. 90(a). Issues that arise during the hearing are decided by the
chairperson of the panel. Id.
367. Id. at para. 90(b).
368. Id. at para. 90(c).
369. Id. at para. 90(d).
370. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1101 (1985). Section 2-1101 states:
Subpoenas. The clerk of any court in which an action is pending shall, from
time to time, issue subpoenas for those witnesses and to those counties in the
State as may be required by either party. Every clerk who shall refuse so to do
shall be guilty of a petty offense and fined any sum not to exceed $100. An order
of court is not required to obtain the issuance by the clerk of a subpoena duces
tecum. For good cause shown, the court on motion may quash or modify any
subpoena or, in the case of a subpoena duces tecum, condition the denial of the
motion upon payment in advance by the person in whose behalf the subpoena is
issued of the reasonable expense of producing any item therein specified.
Id.
371. ILL. S. Cr. R. 90(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 90(e) (Supp. 1987).
372. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1102 (1985). Section 2-1102 states:
Examination of adverse party or agent. Upon the trial of any case any party
thereto or any person for whose immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or
defended, or the officers, directors, managing agents or foreman of any party to
the action, may be called and examined as if under cross-examination at the
instance of any adverse party. The party calling for the examination is not
concluded thereby but may rebut the testimony thus given by countertestimony
and may impeach the witness by proof of prior inconsistent statements.
Id.
373. ILL. S. Cr. R. 90(f), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 90(f) (Supp. 1987).
374. ILL. S. CT. R. 237, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 237 (1985). Supreme Court
Rule 237 provides for compelling the appearance of witnesses at trial. Id.
Civil Procedure
hearings.375
New Rule 91 provides that, if a party fails to attend the arbitra-
tion hearing, the panel will make an award in the party's ab-
sence. 376 The party, by his absence, thereafter waives the right to
reject the award and object to the entry by the court of a judgment
on the award.37 The court, however, has the discretion to vacate
the judgment under sections 2-1301378 and 2-1401379 of the Illinois
Code of Civil Procedure, and order a rehearing in arbitration.8
New Rule 92 defines an award as the determination of the case
in favor of a party in the arbitration hearing.38 ' Rule 92 provides
that the award must dispose of all the claims and cannot exceed
fifteen thousand dollars, excluding interest and costs. 38 2 The rule
also provides that the court can enter judgment on the award by
the motion of any party, unless one of the parties has filed a notice
of rejection of the award and a request for trial pursuant to Rule
93.383
New Rule 93 provides that any party present at arbitration may
file, within thirty days of the filing of the award, a written notice of
rejection of the award and request to proceed to trial, with a certifi-
cate of service of such notice on all parties.384 According to the
rule, all of the parties may proceed to trial upon one party's filing
of a notice of rejection.38 5 Subsection (b) provides that no mention
of arbitration may be made at trial and no arbitrator may be called
to testify at trial.386
New Rule 94 provides the forms of the oath of arbitrators,
award of arbitrators and notice of award.38 7 New Rule 95 sets
375. ILL. S. CT. R. 90(g), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 90(g) (1987).
376. ILL. S. CT. R. 91, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 IA, para. 91 (Supp. 1987).
377. Id.
378. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1301 (1985). Section 2-1301 states in relevant
part:
The court may in its discretion, before final order or judgment, set aside any
default, and may on motion filed within 30 days after entry thereof set aside any
final order or judgment upon any terms and conditions that shall be reasonable.
Id.
379. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1401 (1985). Section 2-1401 provides for relief
from final orders and judgments. Id.
380. ILL. S. CT. R. 91, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 91 (Supp. 1987).
381. ILL. S. CT. R. 92(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I IOA, para. 92(a) (Supp. 1987).
382. Id. at para. 92(b).
383. Id. at para. 92(c).
384. ILL. S. CT. R. 93(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, parn. 93(a) (Supp. 1987).
385. Id.
386. Id. at para. 93(b).
387. ILL. S. CT. R. 94, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, parn. 94 (Supp. 1987).
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forth the form of the notice of rejection of the award.38 8 Under
section 2-1008A of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, 389 an eval-
uation of the effectiveness of mandatory court-annexed arbitration
is to be undertaken and reported to the General Assembly on or
before January 31, 1989, and annually thereafter.
B. New or Modified Illinois Code of Civil Procedure Sections
As part of the Illinois General Assembly's continuing response
to what has been termed the "insurance crisis," several statutes
were enacted in 1986 which are intended to discourage further and
reduce the number of lawsuits concerned with medical malprac-
tice. One such device is to be effectuated by pleading restrictions
with respect to punitive damages. Another device is a remittitur of
excessive punitive damages and channelling the punitive damage
award to the injured party, his or her attorney, and to a state
agency, as set forth in the following sections.
1. Section 2-604.1: Pleading of Punitive Damages
New section 2-604.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure390
became effective November 25, 1986.391 Section 2-604.1 provides
that, in all tort cases in which punitive damages are permitted, no
prayer for punitive damages can be included in the complaint.392
The plaintiff, however, may later amend the complaint by motion
to include a prayer for punitive damages with the permission of the
court.393 The court will grant such motion to amend the complaint
if the plaintiff shows a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial
that would support an award of punitive damages.394 Such a mo-
tion must be made within thirty days of the close of discovery.395
Any such amendment is timely under the applicable statute of limi-
tations if the original pleading was timely.396
388. Id. at para. 95.
389. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1008A (1985).
390. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-604.1 (Supp. 1987). For a further discussion of
section 2-604.1, see M. Pope & J. Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 839,
848-49 (1986).
391. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-604.1 (Supp. 1987).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
[Vol. 19
Civil Procedure
2. Section 2-1207: Remittitur of an Award
of Punitive Damages
New section 2-1207 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure -397
became effective November 25, 1986.398 Section 2-1207 provides
that the trial court has the discretion to enter a remittitur and a
conditional new trial on the award of punitive damages if it be-
lieves the award is excessive.399 In addition, the court can appor-
tion the punitive damages among the plaintiff, his attorney, and the
Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services.40°
3. Section 2-611: Attorney Sanctions
In an effort to discourage and eliminate ill-founded and frivolous
claims in pleadings and other documents, section 2-611 of the Illi-
nois Code of Civil Procedure4 ' was amended in order to provide
more stringent sanctions for papers filed in litigation that are not
well-founded in fact or law, or are interposed for an improper pur-
pose. The amended section is substantially the same as Federal
Rule of Procedure 11, which is being utilized considerably in the
federal system and may lend impetus to use of amended section 2-
611 in the state system.
Amended section 2-61 1402 took effect on November 25, 1986.103
Amended section 2-611 requires that all pleadings, motions, and
other papers be signed either by an attorney of record or by the
submitting party if he is representing himself.40 4 The signature cer-
tifies that the signatory has read the document and believes, after
reasonable inquiry, that it is based on fact and supported by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the modification of existing
law.401 The document cannot be submitted for any improper pur-
pose.40 6 Unsigned documents presented to the court will be
stricken unless signed immediately upon notice of the omission.4 "
397. Id. at para. 2-1207. For a further discussion of section 2-1207, see M. Pope & J.
Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 839, 848 (1986).
398. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Supp. 1987).
399. Id.
400. Id.
401. Id. at para. 2-611. For a further discussion of section 2-611, see M. Pope & J.
Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 839, 849-51 (1986).
402. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-611 (Supp. 1987).
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id. Improper purposes include the submission of the document to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or unnecessary increased cost of litigation. Id.
407. Id.
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Sanctions will be imposed by the court on the person who submits
a signed document that violates this section.408 Section 2-611 pro-
ceedings are to be a part of the civil action in which the document
was filed, and are not to be a separate cause of action giving rise to
separate proceedings. 4° 9
4. Section 2-1003: Discovery and Insurance Information
Effective November 25, 1986, subsection (e) was added to sec-
tion 2-1003 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure.4 10 This subsec-
tion provides that a person does not have to furnish certain
insurance information pursuant to a discovery request.411
5. Section 2-1107.1: Jury Instructions on Plaintiff's
Contributory Fault
New section 2-1107.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure41 2
became effective November 25, 1986.413 This section provides that
the court shall instruct the jury in tort actions that the plaintiff is
barred from recovery if the jury finds that the plaintiff is more than
fifty percent at fault for the proximate cause of his injury.41 4 From
the statutory language of section 2-1107.1, it is made to appear
mandatory that the instruction be given whether or not a plaintiff's
contributory fault has been established. Further, the limitation of
more than fifty percent puts a cap on recovery in those cases in
which a plaintiff could recover some damages irrespective of how
blameworthy he or she may have been with regard to the proxi-
mate cause of the injury or damage. When read in conjunction
with new section 2-1116, discussion of which follows, the General
Assembly has put an end to the "pure" comparative negligence
doctrine established by the Illinois Supreme Court in Alvis v.
Ribar,1 5 in favor of a "modified" comparative negligence system.
408. Id. The sanctions may include the reasonable expenses caused by the filing of
the document. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id. at para. 2-1003.
411. Id. at para. 2-1003(e).
412. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107.1 (Supp. 1987). For a further discussion
of section 2-1107.1, see M. Pope & J. Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
839, 842 (1986).
413. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1107.1 (Supp. 1987).
414. Id.
415. 85 111. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
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6. Section 2-1116: Limitation on Recovery in Tort Actions
Because of Plaintiff's Contributory Fault
New section 2-1116 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure41 6
became effective November 25, 1986.417 This section provides that
if the jury finds that the plaintiff is more than fifty percent at fault,
the plaintiff's contributory fault bars any recovery for his injury.41
Conversely, the section provides that if the jury finds that the
plaintiff is fifty percent or less at fault, his contributory negligence
merely reduces his recovery in proportion to his fault.41 9
7. Section 2-1117: Joint Liability in Tort Actions
New section 2-1117 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure420
became effective November 25, 1986.421 Section 2-1117 states that
multiple defendants in a tort action are jointly and severally liable
for the plaintiff's past and future medically related expenses.4 22
This section provides that any defendant who is less than twenty-
five percent at fault is severally, but not jointly, liable for any other
damages. 23 Conversely, the section provides that any defendant
who is twenty-five or more percent at fault is jointly and severally
liable for any other damages.424 Medical malpractice and pollu-
tion control violation cases are expressly excluded from the opera-
tion of section 2-1117 by provisions of section 2-1118.425 A
practical effect of section 2-1117 is the elimination from joint liabil-
ity of those "deep pocket" defendants who occasionally were
joined in lawsuits for the purpose of responding in damages where
substantially more responsible defendants were impecunious. Any
prospect for asserting a viable contribution claim by the target de-
fendant was, of course, dim.
416. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Supp. 1987). For a further discussion of
section 2-1116, see M. Pope & J. Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 LoY. U. CHI. U. 839,
841-842 (1986).
417. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Supp. 1987).
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at para. 2-1117. For a further discussion of section 2-1117, see M. Pope & J.
Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 839, 844-46 (1986).
421. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Supp. 1987).
422. Id.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at para. 2-1118.
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8. Section 2-1205.1: Reduction in Recovery for Medical
Insurance Payments
New section 2-1205.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure426
became effective November 25, 1986.427 Section 2-1205.1 applies
to tort cases not covered under section 1205 of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure. 428 Both sections modify the collateral source rule
which denied any benefit to a tortfeasor for funds received by a
claimant due to contractual benefits that a claimant procured from
his or her own private funds such as medical, hospital or other
insurance.429 In effect, these statutes merely shift the risk and bur-
den of payment from the tortfeasor's insurance company to the
claimant's insurance company. Subrogation actions may vitiate
the advantage intended by the shift. Section 2-1205.1 provides that
the recovery in tort cases is reduced by the amount of medical ex-
penses in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars that have been
paid or have become payable to the plaintiff at the date of judg-
ment by any insurance company not a party to the judgment.430
Section 2-1205.1 also provides that application for such a reduction
must be made within thirty days of the date of judgment, 431' and
any reduction shall neither exceed fifty percent of the judgment,432
nor impair another's right of recoupment.433 In addition, this sec-
tion provides that damages are increased by the amount of any
insurance costs paid by the plaintiff within two years prior to the
injury or at any time after the injury for the benefits the plaintiff
has received for medical expenses.434
9. Section 13-212: Statute of Repose for Medical Malpractice
Actions by Minors
Under former sections 13-211 and 13-212 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, if a person entitled to bring an action for medical mal-
practice was under the age of eighteen, he or she would have been
426. Id. at para. 2-1205.1. For a further discussion of section 2-1205.1, see M. Pope
& J. Freveletti, Tort Reform Act, 18 LoY. U. CHi. L.J. 839, 847 (1986).
427. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1116 (Supp. 1987).
428. Id. Section 2-1205, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1205 (1985), covers "ac-
tion[s] to recover for... negligence or other wrongful act, not including intentional torts,
on the part of a licensed hospital or physician." Id.
429. Saunders v. Schultz, 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960); Freer v. Rowden,
108 Ill. App. 2d 335, 345, 247 N.E.2d 635 (1969).
430. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1205.1 (Supp. 1987).
431. Id. at para. 1205.1(1).
432. Id. at para. 1205.1(3).
433. Id. at para. 1205.1(2).
434. Id. at para. 1205.1(4).
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entitled to bring such an action within two years after the disability
was removed. That period now has been shortened by legislation
which deletes reference to medical malpractice in section 13-211
and adds a new provision to section 13-212. Effective July 1, 1987
and applicable to cases filed on or after January 1, 1988, subsection
(b) was added to section 13-212 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure.433 Subsection (b) provides that, except as provided in section
436 o13-215 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure, a cause of action
for medical malpractice that accrued when the plaintiff was under
eighteen years of age, is barred if not brought within eight years of
the occurrence alleged as the cause of the plaintiff's injury, 4u7 and
before the plaintiff's twenty-second birthday.4 38 Any action that is
barred or must be brought within less than three years of July 20,
1987, because of this section, may be brought within three years of
July 20, 1987.439
10. Sections 15-1101 through 15-1706: Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Law
New sections 15-1101 through 15-1706440 became effective July
1, 1987.4' These sections are known as the Illinois Mortgage
Foreclosure Law. 4 2 Among the significant changes effected by the
revised foreclosure procedure is: (1) the provision of a redemption
period prior to foreclosure sale, instead of after such sale as re-
quired under the old law; (2) the preservation of the borrower's
equity and remittance of any surplus to the mortgagor or as other-
wise directed by the court; (3) the right of a mortgagor to reinstate
the mortgage by curing all defaults then existing within ninety days
from the date the court obtains jurisdiction over the mortgagor;
435. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212 (Supp. 1987).
436. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-215 (1985). Section 13-215 states:
Fraudulent concealment. If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals
the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the
action may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the person entitled to
bring the same discovers that he or she has such cause of action and not
afterwards.
Id.
437. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-212(b) (Supp. 1987).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 1706 (Supp. 1987). For a further
discussion of the new Illinois Mortgage Foreclosure Law, see Note, The New Illinois
Mortgage Foreclosure Law and Installment Sales Contracts, 19 Loy. U. CHi. L. 245
(1987).
441. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 15-1101 to 1706 (Supp. 1987).
442. Id. at para. 15-1101.
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(4) the requirement of more detailed information in notices of fore-
closure and sale than was formerly required; and (5) the provision
for physical possession of the mortgaged real estate by the mortga-
gor during foreclosure and for a period of thirty days after sale
confirmation under prescribed circumstances.
11. Sections 20-101 through 20-105: Recovery of Fraudulently
Obtained Public Funds
New sections 20-101 through 20-105443 became effective July 1,
1987."4 These sections provide for the recovery in a civil action of
any remuneration paid by the state or any local government unit
and received by a person by any fraudulent means. 44 5
XV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion reveals changes in civil procedure in
considerable depth and breadth and in a variety of subject areas.
Although some of these developments are primarily extensions and
modifications of existing law, certain changes present significantly
new concepts, particularly in the areas of medical malpractice
pleadings and limitations, small claims procedures, court-annexed
mandatory arbitration, comparative fault limitations, and the
mortgage foreclosure law, which revises some former provisions
but also sets forth entirely new provisions effecting this important
procedure. All are worthy of closer examination by litigation
counsel.
443. Id. at paras. 20-101 to 105.
444. Id.
445. Id. at para. 20-102.
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